IThis report was prepared by a committee consisting of C. C. GAMERTSFELDER, H. V. LARSON, .J. M. NIELSEN, W. C. ROESCII (Chairman) and E. C. WATSON. It reports the work of a number of people at Hanford. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
The accident occurred in a facility known as Recuplex within a building known as the 234-5 Building.
When the accident occurred, there were twenty-two persons in the 234-5 Building. The criticality alarm siren started almost at once (several people reported that air-proportional alpha contamination monitors broke down slightly before the siren sounded).
All persons in the 234-5 Building evacuated to a gate house (2701-Z) about 100 yd from 234-5 and then took shelter behind another building (2704-Z) when the former area was found to have an exposure rate of about 200 mr/hr. Within 5-10 min they had evacuated these areas in the evacuation bus or by private car. Two patrolmen, stationed in the gate house at the time of the excursion, increased the total number of evacuees to twenty-four.
The evacuees went to the first aid building for the area (except for one who went to the area badge house and was directed to first aid). By this time the employees who had been in the Recuplex area and had seen the Cerenkov radiation flash were known ; however, all employees were given a "Quick Sort" examinatron to determine who had been exposed to significant fast neutron doses.(l) The counting rate of a Geiger counter held at their abdomen was observed while the person bent over around the 758   DOSIMETRY  INVESTIGATION  OF THE RECUPLEX  CRITICALITY  ACCIDENT counter. Only those employees who had been in the Recuplex area gave significant readings.
highly exposed, were sent to the Hanford \Yirolc Body Counter for examination. The next da, Contamination surveys of the evacuees were also made while they were at the first aid building. No contamination was found. Their personnel dosimeters were collected for examination. Personal effects were examined for radioactivity and then sent in for laboratory study. The first blood and hair samples and excreta collections were made.
After examination and treatment at Kadlec Hospital, four persons, including the three most all but one of the remaining evacuees were ahc, examined at the Counter; the last man \\'a, examined the following day. Whole body count\ and blood and excreta collection were repeated on the most highly exposed persons until no radioactivity of interest was detectable. Figure 3 shows where these people were standing at the time they saw the Cerenkov radiation flash. Employee #I was standing immediately below the critical vessel, the K-9 Tank, manipulating a valve at the face of the hood containing the tank. His body was very close to the hood wall. His eyes were about 5 ft from the center of the K-9 Tank; the parts of the trunk of his body were between 6 and 8 ft away. Employee #17 was standing about 2 ft to the side and about 5 ft behind Employee #l . There was a movable lead shield behind #l, but #17 was in full view of #l and of the K-9 Tank.
#17's eyes were about 10 ft from the center of K-9 and the trunk of his body was 10-l 1 ft away. The K-9 Tank is cylindrical with a capacity of 69 1.; it contained about 45 1. when the excursion occurred.
The tank has a Pyrex wall about 318 in. thick and a steel bottom plate about 1 in. thick.
#1 and #17 were exposed to radiations coming through both the wall and the bottom.
The only other materials between them and the tank were the $-in. thick lucite hood walls and some plumbing inside the hood. Employee #23 was standing in front of another hood about 26 ft from the center of K-9. Most of the radiation reaching him probably came through the sides of the tank. The only materials between him and K-9 were the lucite walls of the hood containing K-9 and the hood 'he was facing and the thin metal back of the latter.
Of the next two most highly exposed people, Employee #6 was about 30 ft from K-9 with one concrete wall about 4 in. thick and one metal partition wall in between. This employee delayed to lock up some classified documents but was outside the building in about 2.5 sec. Employee #21 was about 40 ft away and was shielded by an &in. thick concrete wall. terest can be obtained from instruments that were near the scene of the accident. Two recording BF, counters (one for high levels, one for low) were operating at the time of the accident in an incinerator room in the 234-5 Building.
The data from the chart recorders are plotted in Fig. 4 . They indicate an initial excursion the exact magnitude of which cannot be determined because the flux level is recorded only every 30 set and it may be expected to vary by orders of magnitude within such a time period.
Following this initial pulse which presumably activated the criticality alarm there was a continuing nuclear reaction of a magnitude sufficient to keep the recorder off-scale for a period of about 30 min.
After the recorder returned to on-scale readings the fissioning continued at a generally reduced rate till 36 hr after the incident began. It appears that those in a position to be most seriously exposed to the critical vessel evacuated in time to limit their exposure to only a part or all of the initial excursion.
A threshold detectoG) was located about 26 ft from the critical vessel. Its position is shown in Fig. 3 . At least one of the steel beams of the stairway shown in the figure was on the line-of-sight between the vessel and the dosimeter. The metal grid floor of the mezzanine level, the stairway, and another hood at the head of the stairs provided masses of material in which radiation from K-9 could scatter and then reach the detector.
These certainly influenced the relative spectra of the neutrons reaching the detector as compared to those reaching the men. For lack of other information, however, the spectrum received by the detector was used in analyzing other pertinent data.
The detector was removed about 96 min after the accidental excursions started so it was present during the large excursion shown in Fig. 4 as well as during the time the people were present. The results obtained from analysis of the threshold detector are given in Table 1 . The results relative to the neutrons/cm2 measured with the plutonium foil are also given. As described in theRef. (2), the shielded plutonium foil is assumed to measure the neutrons above 1 Ke\'. The number spectrum is presented in Fig. 5 . For comparison several other spectra obtainctl with threshold detectors (s-5) and normalized ill the same way are shown in Fig. 6 . Figure 7 shows histograms prepared from calculatrtl spectra;@) since information is lost in going frorll the calculated spectra to the histograms, the original normalized spectra are given in Fig. 8 . There is not close agreement between 111~ present spectrum and any of the others, but the general features are the same and the differences are of the sort to be expected if the present Wsuits include the effects of a significant nunlll(%l of scattered, and hence lower energy, neutroll\. The threshold detect interpreted in a differe described in the origin present case the fast ne made in known fluxes than with thermal neut neutron energy spectrl the activation in the covered gold foils in t the thermal neutrons/ activation cross sectio whose velocity is 2200 r Table 1 give k = 0.042. This is shown as a dashed line in Fig. 5 and is in good agreement with the spectrum determined with the threshold foils.
PERSONNEL DOSIMETERS
Each of the persons near the critical vessel* at the time of the accident was wearing his Hanford Film Badge Dosimeter.($)
The dosimeters had last been exchanged 15 days before the accident ; therefore, particularly for the smaller doses, a significant part of the darkening of the film may have been produced during employment prior to the accident.
The exposures of Employees #l, #17, and #23 were so great that the developed sensitive (508) film from their dosimeters was too dark to permit optical density measurements.
The
7. Theoretical spectra (histograms) calculated for threshold detectors.
normalized to unit dose for the neutrons above 1 KeV.
The threshold detector was calibrated and interpreted in a different mannerc7) from that 0.4 -described in the original reference. '2) In the .g Present case the fast neutron calibrations were g made in known fluxes of fast neutrons rather g 0. These readings were compared with similar readings on the calibration filmsthey gave exposure dose estimates that con: c -- radiation. This is 7 per cent of the exposure #23. The very dark 508 films were exposed t(l dose measured as described above. estimate the neutron flux density that had produced the excess darkening on the 1290 film behind the silver shields.
Fresh films were exposed to gamma ray doses in the range of those to which the people were exposed and then exposed to slow neutrons until the total flux density producing the same density pattern as on the personnel film was found. The neutron flux densities found in this way were multiplied by a factor 0.79 to allow for the fact that part of the activation during the accident was due to intermediate energy neutrons. The factor was calculated from the gold foil activities in the threshold detector and the thermal neutron cross sections and resonance integrals of gold and silver's).
The thermal neutron fields estimated by this method are given in Table 3. individual persons). The difference between this figure and those above is due to the presence of a very large proportion of low energy neutrons near the Vinca reactor.
If the threshold detector measurements reported for that reactor and those reported above for the present criticality accident are used to estimate the neutron first collision dose per unit Naz4 activation,@l) the rad-kg/PC factor for the Hanford accident is about 2.3 times that for the Vinca, i.e. about 190 rad-kg/PC. This is satisfactorily close to the value used above. Although, as remarked above, the threshold detector measurements for the Hanford accident probably represent a different spectrum than that to which the employees were exposed because of attenuation and scattering; the comparison of the Vinca and Hanford spectra to estimate the above factor is not much affected by the difference.
It is estimated that the 1L'az4 burdens were determined to an accuracy of about 5 per cent where counting data were not limited by statistics.
Counting statistics became important for burdens of about 0.001 ,uc (before correction for decay). Those employees in whom less than WHOLE 
BODY COUNTING
The occupants of the 234-5 Building at the The measured values of Naa4 activity, corrected for decay since the time of the accident, and the individuals' weights are given in Table 4 . No correction was made for Na-24 that might have been eliminated before the counting took place; it is estimated that only a few per cent were missed in this way for those counted immediately. The quotient of the number of ,uc by the body weight in kg was multiplied by 215 rad-kg/,uc to obtain the first collision dose to the person.
The factor 215 rad-kg/PC was obtained by averaging the following two experimentalvalues. Measurementsos) with a burro at the mock-up of the Oak Ridge criticality accident gave 204 'ad-kg/PC.
An 0.001 ,uc was detected were assigned a dose of less than 0.01 rad. The presence of K42 was noticed in those people who had large Na24 burdens.
The amounts present were consistent with estimates from abundance and cross-section data which indicate that there should be about one seventh as many ,uc of K42. Employees #l, #17, and #23 were counted several more times at the body counter.
The Na24 was observed to disappear with the expected 15-hr half-life. Each of these three men was found to have had some Auls8 produced in fillings in his teeth. In the case of #17 the gold was in bridge-work that could be removed.
This made it possible to count him with the P32 counter. (22) (After the original rep&t on the counter, the detector was moved to a counting position over the head rather than over the chest in order to reduce interference by other isotopes; the presence of radioactive gold fillings would have prevented such measurements).
The first count for P32 was made on #17 ten days after the accident. The P32 was easily detected.
The counting rate due to the P32 decreased exponentially with a 14.5 day half-life (i.e. the radioactive decay half-life) rather than the 8-10 day halflife observed for subjects who receive P32 intravenously.
This indicated that most of the Pa being observed was formed in the relatively tightly bound phosphorous, probably that in the skull, rather than that more mobile portion in which the intravenously injected P32 appears.
Thus the calibration of the counter, which was done with intravenously injected subjects, was not applicable; if applied anyway, the calibration would have indicated two to three times as much P32 as predicted from the activity of the Naz4 present.
Na24 IN BLOOD
Two Z-cm3 blood samples each for Employees #l, #I7 and #23 were counted for Naz4. The first samples were counted on a 3-in. well crystal scintillation counter. They had coagulated before they could be counted.
The second set of samples was treated with heparin to prevent coagulation.
They were counted for 30 min on a total absorption gamma-ray spectrometer.@s)
The results of the two counts, corrected for decay from the time of the ac- cident, are given in Table 5 . The agreement is considered reasonably good. The activity density of the Na24 in the whole blood was converted to neutron first collision dose by multiplying by the factor 1.65 x 10" rad-cm3/pc. This is the ratio of first collision dose to blood activity found in the Oak Ridge burro exp@riment.(lg)
If the sodium in the whole body and in the blood are equally irradiated by slow neutrons or if there is rapid equilibration of the sodium throughout all compartments in the body, then this factor should be related to the factor used above with the whole body counter data. The ratio of PC/kg of Na24 in the body to ,uc/cm3 in the blood should equal the ratio of the densit! of sodium in the body (105 g/70 kg for the standard man(24)) to that in the blood (1.91 \ 1 Op3 g/cm3(25) ): (1.91 x 10-s x 70)/105 = 1.27 x 10-s. 1 .65 x lo5 x 1.27 x 10-3 = 210 radkg/,uc, in good agreement with the figure chosen above for the whole body counting.
This comparison is significant because the blood and whole body activities of the burro were determined in different ways. A similar cornparis can be made using the data obtained after th( critical accident at Los Alamos.
The fatally csposed employee was found to have 0.00531 //cl cm3 of Naz4 in whole blood and 293 ,UC in his wholebody,which weighed 71.5 kg.c26) (0.00531 x 71.5)/293 = 1.30 x 10-3 in good agreement with the above value.
This latter value is particularly significant because the neutron dose distribution in the man's body was very nonuniform.
The agreement between the two results indicates that the sodium had been able 10 equilibrate effectively throughout the body. The first urine sample #17 and #23 were co' crystal scintillation cou ments were repeated an( measured on a 5%. w Counter. (27) Na24 IN EXCRETA RADIOACTIVITY OF OTHER OBJECTS The first urine samples from Employees #I, #17 and #23 were counted on a 3-in. well crystal scintillation counter. These measurements were repeated and all later samples were measured on a 5-in. well crystal scintillation counter.(s7) Sample size varied from 2 to 500 cm3 and counting time from 5 to 30 min depending on the activity of the sample. The results, corrected for decay from the time of the accident, are given in Table 6 .
The Naz4 activity found in feces was negligible.
A variety of other objects was collected from the three principals and measured for radioactivitv in a 5-in. well crvstal scintillation counter.@7) Later these same objects were activated with slow neutrons in the large moderator in the same way as in the study of the film badges described above.(ls)
The neutron fluxes in the large moderator that produced the same activity as in the accident were corrected to allow .for the intermediate energv neutron
VI P= IN HAIR activation during the accident. The effective resonance integral for the gold in the eye frames of Employee #17's glasses was found to be 581 barns (compared to 1300 for thin foils (8)) by the cadmium ratio., Otherwise, the thin foil values were used. The thermal neutron fluxes estimated in this way are listed in Table 8 .
Samples of hair were taken from Employees #l, #17 and #23 from several locations on their bodies. The P32 was separated from the hair'ss) and counted in a low background proportional counter.
The sulfur content was determined for several samples by a spectrometric method and found to agree with the results of PETERSON et ~1.'~) so their value, 47.7 mg sulfur per g of hair, was then assumed for all calculations.
The results are listed in Table 7 . The time integral of the flux density of neutrons having energies greater than 2. For this reason none of the doses given in this report has been converted to anRBEdose. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY For purposes of administrative. recording of Our primary sources of information concernwhole body radiation exposures of the employees ing the exposure of individuals during tl~ MJe do not know if there were any other critical excursions during this period or whether they received practically all their dose during the first one. The only indication we have that these subsequent motions were not very important is the value of the ratio of the gamma ray to the neutron dose. This ratio was between 2 and 3 for the two men close to the critical vessel. This is in good agreement with values observed in similar circumstances.(6J Their motions and the possible later excursions would affect their personnel dosimeter readings even more than the Nas* activation because of the changing shielding of the dosimeters by the body. The fact that they do not appear to have had a substantial effect on the ratio suggests that most of the dose came during one critical excursion while they were nearly stationary.
The first collision doses determined from sulfur activation in hair were about one half those obtained from Nas* activation. They should, of course, be lower because they are the doses for only those neutrons above 2.5 MeV. The threshold detector, Table 1 , would indicate that only 20 per cent of the dose should come from such neutrons.
The application of the latter data are suspect because, as already discussed, the detector may not have been exposed to exactly the same spectrum as the people. On the other hand, some of the difference may be due to a difference in the relation between first collision dose and Na2* activation in the calibration experiments and in the present accident because of greater non-uniformity of the absorbed dose distribution during the accident.
The neutrons/cm2 detected by sulfur activation can also be compared with the number of thermal neutrons.
There are several measurements of the two on exposed people that are for nearly the same parts of the body. A ratio of neutrons/cm2 above the sulfur threshold to thermal neutrons/cm2 of about 0.2 was obtained where such measurements were made. The threshold detector gave 0.3. Probably this is as close agreement as we can expect. The scattering and absorbing materials in a human body are enough different from those near the detector to produce this much difference in the thermal flux density.
It appears that there may be some uncertainty in the neutron doses from the Na2* activation, but that it is probably not very great.
Employee #I received the highest exposure. The neutron first collision dose was 23-30 rad. The exposure dose was 63 r at the surface in the central region of his body.
The dose due to thermal neutrons was negligible in comparison. The Pss measurements in hair suggest a variation by a factor of at least 2 for the neutron first collision doses in different parts of the body. This is compatible with variation as the inverse square of the distance from the center of the critical vessel. The neutron dose to the eyes is considered to be of importance in an exposure such as this because of the possibility of cataract formation.
Inverse square variation suggests a first collision dose of 42-54 rad from neutrons for his eyes.
Employee #17 received the next highest exposure which resulted in 9-12 rad from neutrons and 23 r in the central region of the body. These doses are related to those received by #l by the inverse square of the distance from the center of the critical vessel. Ry the inverse square law the neutron dose to his eyes must have been 11-14 rad.
Employee #23 received about 3 rad from neutrons and 13 r and these must have been
